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Abstract This chapter will analyse the legal consequences of the outcome of the
Dutch referendum of 6 April 2016 concerning the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement. The result of the referendum raised the question whether a single
Member State can ‘veto’ the entry into force of a bilateral association agreement. Due
to the unprecedented nature of this situation and the fact that the EU Treaties do no
give a clear answer to this question, many issues related to the non-ratification of
mixed agreements remain unclear. Therefore, after briefly analysing the ‘mixed’
nature of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and its current legal status, the legal
consequences of the Dutch ‘tegen’ (against) are explored, focussing on the provi-
sional application of the agreement. Finally, the solution of the Dutch government to
deal with the outcome of the referendum, and some alternatives, are discussed.
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14.1 Introduction
On 6 April 2016 the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement was rejected in the
Netherlands in an advisory referendum, which was organised pursuant to the Dutch
Advisory Referendum Act (DRA), with 61.1% of the votes. The fact that this
advisory referendum, which had a low turnout of 32%, could complicate the rati-
fication procedure of a landmark international agreement for the entire European
Union raises several legal and political questions. It is actually the first time that a
single Member State is (potentially) unable to ratify a bilateral EU mixed agreement
(i.e. an international agreement that is concluded by the EU and its Member States
on the one hand, and a third State on the other).1 Because the political character of
this referendum and the content and geopolitical implications of the Association
Agreement have already been discussed elsewhere,2 this chapter will mainly focus
on the legal implications of this referendum for the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement. After briefly analysing the ‘mixed’ nature of the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement and its current legal status, the legal consequences of the
Dutch ‘tegen’ (against) are explored. Finally, the solution of the Dutch government
to deal with the outcome of the referendum, and some alternatives, are discussed.
14.2 Mixed (Association) Agreements
The EU-Ukraine Association agreement is concluded as a mixed agreement. These
are agreements concluded by third parties, on the one hand, and the EU and its
Member States, on the other, because these agreements cover elements of both EU
and Member State competence. The procedural consequence of ‘mixity’ is that the
28 Member States have to ratify the agreement alongside the EU, each according to
their own ‘constitutional’ ratification procedures. Mixed agreements are a common
feature in the EU’s external relations. The fact that the expression ‘mixed
1 For a detailed analysis of mixed agreements, see Heliskoski 2001. For examples of exceptionally
long ratification procedures, see Rosas 2014.
2 For a comprehensive overview of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, see Van der Loo
2016a.
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agreements’ was absent from the original EEC Treaty did not prevent one of the
first bilateral agreements concluded by the Community, the Association Agreement
with Greece of 1961, from being mixed.3 Also, the most recent agreement signed
by the EU, the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA), was categorized as a mixed agreement.
Traditionally, association agreements are concluded as mixed agreements for a
number of reasons. First, they are typically comprehensive in nature providing a
general framework for cooperation involving areas belonging to EU and Member
State competences. Second, mixity is often a pragmatic solution to avoid internal
competence battles among EU institutions and Member States. Third, the political
importance of association agreements explains why Member States prefer to be a
contracting party in their own right, in addition to the EU. It not only endows them
with additional bargaining power during the negotiations and in the ratification
process but also upholds their visibility vis-à-vis third countries.4 The mixed nature
of association agreements creates an additional reinforced unanimity as the pro-
cedural legal basis of such agreements is, inter alia, Article 218(8) TFEU,5 which
already requires unanimity in the Council for the conclusion of association
agreements.
However, from a strict legal point of view, there is no requirement for associ-
ation agreements to be mixed. As Rosas notes,
generally speaking, [association agreements] do not need to be mixed, as the Treaty of
Lisbon has widened the scope of the common commercial policy and has introduced a
fairly wide formulation of supervening exclusivity in Article 3(2) TFEU and what seems to
ban an even wider formulation of treaty-making powers in general in Article 216(1) TFEU
as well as a more integrated CFSP competence also covered by Article 216 TFEU on Union
treaty-making powers.6
Moreover, since the Lisbon Treaty7 abolished the pillar structure and created a
single legal personality for the EU, the inclusion of Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) provisions in a broader framework agreement such as the
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement does not automatically require mixity. In order
to render mixity legally more defendable, clauses perceived to fall under Member
States competences have been inserted into association agreements or bilateral
agreements of a general nature, such as provisions on political dialogue or cultural
cooperation.
Hence, the choice for mixity ‘is not necessarily a result of legal orthodoxy but
frequently the consequence of crude political interests on behalf of the Member
3 Maresceau 2010.
4 Ibid.
5 2012 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated version), C 326/47
(TFEU).
6 Rosas 2014, at 24.
7 2007 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community, 2702 UNTS 3.
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States’.8 This was recently illustrated during the process of the conclusion of the
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo. Because not all Member
States recognise Kosovo as an independent State, the EU-Kosovo Association
Agreement was concluded as an ‘EU-only’ agreement.9 This option prevents that
the EU Member States (including those who do not recognise Kosovo) need to
ratify the agreement, which would entail a de facto recognition of Kosovo.
14.3 The Current Legal Status of the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement
After the Maidan revolution, which was sparked in November 2013 by the unex-
pected last-minute decision of the previous Ukrainian government not to sign the
agreement, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement was finally signed in March
and June 2014. However, several procedural steps were—and still are—required
before the agreement can fully enter into force. For example, the European
Parliament needs to give its consent for association agreements,10 which occurred
for the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement simultaneously with the Ukrainian
Verkhovna Rada on 16 September 2014.
As noted above, mixed agreements also require the ratification of all 28 Member
States. Such a ratification procedure usually takes 3–4 years. However, in order to
circumvent this long ratification process, most mixed agreements provide for the
possibility of provisional application. Article 486 of the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement indeed States that the parties ‘agree to provisionally apply this
Agreement in part, as specified by the Union, […] and in accordance with their
respective internal procedures and legislation as applicable’.11 A legal basis for the
provisional application of international agreements concluded by the EU was
included in the Amsterdam Treaty12 (now Article 218(5) TFEU). It reflects Article
25 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),13 according to which
a treaty may provide for such provisional application or the negotiating States may
agree to it. Another option which was used by the EU to alleviate the negative effect
of mixity is to sign and conclude formally a separate agreement (often called an
‘Interim Agreement’) incorporating only those parts of the main agreement that fall
squarely within the Union (before the Lisbon Treaty: ‘Community’) competences.14
8 Van Elsuwege 2017.
9 Ibid.
10 Article 218(6)(a)(i) TFEU.
11 Article 486(3) EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.
12 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, 2700 UNTS 161.
13 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT).
14 On such ‘Interim Agreements’, see Flaesch-Mougin and Bosse-Platière 2014.
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Given the political significance of the Agreement, the Council agreed on an
exceptional wide scope of provisional application of the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement. Usually, the provisional application or ‘Interim Agreements’ of asso-
ciation agreements or other framework agreements only cover the trade(-related)
elements of the agreement. But in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, the
scope of the provisional application goes beyond the trade part of the agreement
(i.e. the deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA)) and also includes the
entire titles on General Principles, Financial Cooperation and General and Final
Provisions and provisions regarding political dialogue, rule of law and movement
of persons and economic and sector cooperation.15 It has to be noted that the
Commission even proposed a broader scope for provisional application, including,
inter alia, the entire title on Political Dialogue and Reform, Political Association,
Cooperation and Convergence in the field of Foreign and Security Policy.16
However, the Member States, in particular the UK, triggered objections against the
proposed scope of provisional application and agreed on a more limited—but still
extensive—scope of provisional application.17
This broad scope raised questions on the potential provisional application of
‘mixed’ elements of the agreement. Evidently, only the provisions falling under EU
competences (exclusive or shared) can be applied provisionally by the Council
Decision for signature and provisional application. This problem is partially cir-
cumvented by the fact that the provisions responsible for the mixity of an agreement
are never specifically indicated in the relevant Council Decision (or another doc-
ument), mainly because the Commission and the Council would find it very difficult
to agree on such a clear delineation of competences. The provisional application of
mixed elements is also addressed in the Council Decisions on the signing and
provisional application of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement as they state that
the listed provisions for provisional application shall be applied provisionally ‘only
to the extent that they cover matters falling within the Union’s competence,
15 Combined reading of the Council Decision of 17 March 2014 on the signing, on behalf of the
European Union, and provisional application of the Association Agreement between the European
Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and
Ukraine, of the other part, as regards the Preamble, Article 1, and Titles I, II and VII thereof,
2014/295/EU (Council Decision 2014/295/EU) and Council Decision of 23 June 2014 on the
signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of the Association
Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their
Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, as regards Title III (with the
exception of the provisions relating to the treatment of third-country nationals legally employed as
workers in the territory of the other Party) and Titles IV, V, VI and VII thereof, as well as the
related Annexes and Protocols, 2014/668/EU (Council Decision 2014/668/EU).
16 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the
European Union, and provisional application of the Association Agreement between the European
Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, COM(2013) 289
final, 15 May 2013.
17 European Commission, ‘Note à l’attention des membres du GRI’, 6 June 2014 (not public, on
file with the author).
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including matters falling within the Union’s competence to define and implement a
common foreign and security policy’.18 Their preambles also indicate that ‘the
provisional application of parts of the Agreement does not prejudge the allocation
of competences between the Union and its Member States in accordance with the
Treaties.’
The initiation of the provisional application of a mixed agreement requires at the
EU’s side the adoption of a Council Decision. Because the provisional application
covers in this case an association agreement, unanimity is required in the Council
for the adoption of this Decision.19 Moreover, a practice has been developed by the
Commission and the Council to only initiate the provisional application of mixed
agreements that require the consent of the European Parliament after having
received such a consent.20 The provisional application of the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement started on 1 November 2014, however, the provisional
application of the DCFTA was postponed until 1 January 2016 in response to
political pressure from Russia.21
14.4 Legal Consequences of the Referendum
Meanwhile, all the EU Member States have ratified the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement, with one notable exception. In the Netherlands, the Approval Act for
the ratification of the agreement was adopted by the House of Representatives
(Second Chamber) on 7 April 2015 and the Senate (First Chamber) on 7 July
2015.22 However, the entry into force of this Approval Act (and thus the
Netherland’s ratification) was suspended due to the start of the referendum pro-
cedure under the DRA.
It is now claimed that the Dutch voters have rejected the Association Agreement
in the referendum, but the reality is more complex. The subject of the referendum
was actually not the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement as such, but the Approval
18 See for example Article 4 of Council Decision 2014/295/EU and Article 4 of Council Decision
2014/668/EU.
19 The Council Decisions for the signature and provisional application of the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement (ibid) have as a legal basis, inter alia, subparagraph 2 of Article 218(8)
TFEU, which requires unanimity for the conclusion of association agreements.
20 In a Resolution adopted on 23 October 2013, the European Parliament called for the provisional
application of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement immediately upon signature, clearing the
way for provisional application of the agreement. Moreover, the European Parliament gave its
consent already on 16 September 2014, before the provisional application of the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement was (partially) initiated on 1 November 2014.
21 For an overview of this process, see Van der Loo 2016a.
22 Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Wet van 8 juli 2015, houdende goedkeuring van
de op 27 juni 2014 te Brussel tot stand gekomen Associatieovereenkomst tussen de Europese Unie
en de Europese Gemeenschap voor Atoomenergie en haar lidstaten, enerzijds, en Oekrai ̈ne,
anderzijds, (2015) Nr. 315, 28 July 2015.
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Act that ratified the agreement. This law was the legal instrument by which the
Kingdom of the Netherlands ratified the Member States’ elements of the ‘mixed’
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Most likely, few Dutch voters were aware of
this subtle technicality when they voted on 6 April. In fact, the situation is even
more abstract as nowhere in the agreement or in the Council Decisions for signature
of the agreement is it indicated which provisions of the agreement fall under
exclusive Member State (and thus Dutch) competences. As noted above, such a
delineation is traditionally avoided to prevent competence conflicts between the
European Commission and the European Parliament on the one hand, and the
Council and the Member States on the other. The scope of the provisional appli-
cation of the agreement already gives an indication of which elements are not
considered as Member States’ competences, as only provisions falling under the EU
competences can be provisionally applied. However, this does not give a complete
and exact overview.
According to the DRA, the Dutch government now has to decide whether it will
propose a law that repeals the Approval Act, or a law that confirms it. In either
scenario, approval by the Parliament is required, but this ‘repealing’ or ‘confirming’
law cannot again be the subject of a new referendum.
In any case, the immediate legal consequences of the no-vote are limited. As long
as the Netherlands does not ratify the Association Agreement, it cannot fully enter
into force. The agreement can only enter into force if all the contracting Parties (thus
the EU, the 28Member States and Ukraine) have ratified it.23 Because the Union only
ratifies a mixed agreement after all the Member States have done so, also the EU still
needs to conclude the agreement.24 However, this has no impact on the provisional
application of the agreement, which theoretically can continue indefinitely because
there is no ‘deadline’ for the provisional application. The Dutch Foreign Minister has
replied to a parliamentary question that it would not make sense to continue with the
provisional application of the Association Agreement in the event it is not ratified.25
It would indeed be paradoxical to indefinitely provisionally apply an agreement that
it is not ratified, especially considering that the aim of provisional application is to
bridge the temporal gap between signature and ratification of an agreement.
However, the Council Decisions on the signing of the agreement do not specify an
expiry date for the provisional application. Moreover, Member States cannot ter-
minate the Union’s provisional application of the agreement. The provision in the
23 Article 486 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.
24 However, there are numerous examples of multilateral mixed agreements concluded by the EU,
but not by all Member States. On this practice, see Heliskoski 2001.
25 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Vragen van het lid Omtzigt (CDA), Verhoeven (D66) en
Voordewind (ChristenUnie) aan de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken over de voorlopige
inwerkingtreding van het associatieverdrag tussen de EU en Oekraïne (ingezonden 5 januari 2016)
—Antwoord van Minister Koenders (Buitenlandse Zaken) (ontvangen 5 februari 2016) (Minister
of Foreign Affairs Bert Koenders, Answers to Members Omtzigt, Verhoeven, Voordewind on the
provisional application of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement), (2015–2016) Nr. 1401, 5
February 2016.
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Association Agreement on provisional application (Article 486) states that either
party may terminate the provisional application of the agreement. However, only the
EU provisionally applies a part of the agreement (i.e. a large part of the provisions
falling under Union competences), and not the Member States. As recognised by the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the decision authorising the Union’s
provisional application is adopted by the Council, ‘and no competence is granted to
the Member States for the adoption of such a decision’.26 The termination of the
Union’s provisional application by a Member State would be clearly in breach with
the principle of autonomy of the EU institutions and would be at odds with the duty of
sincere cooperation, enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU.27 Because Article 218 TFEU
does not provide clear rules on how to terminate the provisional application of an
agreement, the same procedure to initiate the provisional application should be fol-
lowed. For association agreements (such as the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement)
this would require at the EU’s side a unanimous Decision of the Council. Therefore,
this ‘reversed unanimity’ would imply that no single EU Member State (e.g. the
Netherlands) can halt the provisional application of the agreement.
The situation where one Member State would be unable to ratify a mixed agree-
ment is unprecedented. However, in the context of the signature of (EU-Canada)
CETA some relevant statements and declarationswere adopted byEU institutions and
Member States with regard to the agreement’s provisional application.28 The signa-
ture of the mixed CETA Agreement was in October 2016 in limbo for almost two
weeks because the Belgian region ofWallonia refused to give its consent to the federal
Belgian government to sign the deal. In order to get theWalloon government on board,
numerous statements and declarations have been adopted,mainly to accommodate the
concerns of the Walloon government.29 The Council adopted also the following
statement relating to the provisional application of CETA:
If the ratification of CETA fails permanently and definitively because of a ruling of a
constitutional court, or following the completion of other constitutional processes and formal
notification by the government of the concerned state, provisional application must be and
will be terminated. The necessary steps will be taken in accordance with EU procedures.30
26 Case C-28-12 (European Commission v Council), ECJ (Grand Chamber), Judgment, ECLI:EU:
C:2015:282, 28 April 2015.
27 Ibid.
28 These statements and declarations are published on the website of the Council: European
Council—Council of the European Union (2016) EU-Canada trade agreement: Council adopts
decision to sign CETA, 28 October 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/
2016/10/28-eu-canada-trade-agreement/?utm_source=dsms-auto&utm_medium=email&utm_
campaign=EU-Canada+trade+agreement%3a+Council+adopts+decision+to+sign+CETA, acces-
sed 9 March 2017.
29 For an analysis of these different statements and declarations, see Van der Loo 2016b.
30 Council of the European Union (2016) Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the
other part—Statements to the Council minutes, 13463/1/16 REV 1, http://data.consilium.europa.
eu/doc/document/ST-13463-2016-REV-1/en/pdf, accessed 13 January 2017, at 14 (emphasis
added).
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Moreover, statements by Germany, Poland, Belgium and Austria declare that
these countries can exercise their right to terminate the provisional application as
provided in CETA.31 This means that if one Member State refuses to ratify CETA,
the provisional application will need to be terminated. This is remarkable because
this implies that a Member State can block issues falling under exclusive EU
competences. However, as argued above, this termination will not happen ‘auto-
matically’, but would require the adoption of a Council Decision.
14.5 The Way Out
14.5.1 The Decision of the Heads of State or Government,
Meeting Within the European Council
Although the referendum is not binding, Prime Minister Rutte stated that the rati-
fication ‘could not go ahead unhindered’. The Dutch government is now in the
awkward position that it cannot ignore the outcome of the referendum, which would
be a risky domestic move with general elections scheduled for March 2017, but it
also would not want to block the conclusion of this landmark agreement. After
months of informal negotiations and discussions in the Hague and Brussels, the
Dutch government suggested in a letter on 31 October to the Dutch Parliament the
option to ratify the agreement while accommodating the main concerns of the
no-voters in a ‘a legally binding solution’.32 This would be a ‘Decision of the Heads
of State or Government, meeting within the European Council’. This Decision
would need to accommodate the concerns that were raised during the referendum
by specifying that:
(i) The Association Agreement is not a stepping-stone to EU Accession
(ii) The Association Agreement does not include a ‘collective security guaran-
tee’ and does not impose military cooperation on the Member States
(iii) The Association Agreement does not give Ukrainian employers access to the
EU labour market
(iv) The Association Agreement does not include an obligation for financial
support to Ukraine
(v) Strengthening of the rule of law and anti-corruption policies are key elements
of the Association Agreement.
31 CETA’s provision on provisional application (i.e. Article 30.7(3)) is similar to the one in the
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, described above.
32 Minister President M. Rutte and Minister of Foreign Affairs B. Koenders, Kamerbrief over
referendum over het Associatieovereenkomst met Oekraïne, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken,
Nr. 2016Z19902, 31 October 2016.
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Such a ‘Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the
European Council’ was finally adopted on 15 December 2016 and annexed to the
European Council conclusions that were adopted that day.33 This Decision includes
the five aforementioned points and states that it is ‘in full conformity with the
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the EU treaties’. It will take effect once the
Netherlands has ratified the agreement and the Union has concluded it.
This option deserves some comments. First of all, it needs to be analysed to what
extent it is actually ‘a legally binding solution’, as argued by the Dutch government.
A ‘Decision of Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European
Council’ is not something new. For example, a similar Decision was recently
drafted in February 2016 in the context of adopting a ‘new settlement for the United
Kingdom with the European Union’.34 As rightfully noted in a an Opinion of the
legal counsel of the European Council, such a Decision is
of an intergovernmental nature, not a decision of the European Council as an institution of
the European Union under Article 15 TEU, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of
Article 288 TFEU, which would require to be based on a specific legal basis in the
Treaties.35
Nevertheless, this draft Decision (which became defunct after the outcome of the
Brexit referendum) was considered binding under international law because it
constitutes ‘an instrument of international law by which the 28 Member States
agree on a joint interpretation of certain provisions of the EU Treaties and on
principles and arrangements for action in related circumstances’.36 This argument is
essentially based on Article 11 VCLT which states that the consent of a State to be
bound by an agreement may be expressed by any means agreed by the parties and
Article 31(3)(a) VCLT which mentions that a subsequent agreement between the
33 European Council and Council of the European Union (2016) European Council Conclusions on
Ukraine, 15 December 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/15-
euco-conclusions-ukraine/, accessed 9 March 2017 (European Council Conclusions on Ukraine,
15 December 2016).
34 European Council, Annex II to the Conclusions of the European Council meeting, Statement on
Section A of the Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European
Council, concerning a new settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union, EUCO
1/16, 19 February 2016. This draft Decision followed previous practice in comparable situations
such as the Decision of the Heads of State and Government, meeting within the European Council,
concerning certain problems raised by Denmark on the Treaty on European Union, which was
adopted by the Heads of State or Government at Edinburgh, in the context of the European
Council of 11 and 12 December 1992 or the Decision of the Heads of State or Government of the
27 Member States of the EU, meeting within the European Council, on the concerns of the Irish
people on the Treaty of Lisbon, which was adopted in the context of the European Council of 18
and 19 June 2009.
35 European Council, Opinion of the Legal Counsel, Draft Decision of the Heads of State or
Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning a new settlement for the United
Kingdom within the European Union (doc. EUCO 4/16) - Form, legal nature, legal effects and
conformity with the EU Treaties, EUCO 15/16, 8 February 2016.
36 Ibid.
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parties on the interpretation of a previous treaty is part of the context to be taken
into account for interpreting that treaty.
The Opinion of the legal counsel with regard to the Decision on the EU-Ukraine
Association adds that that the Decision needs to be regarded ‘as an instrument of
international law, by which the EU Member States agree on how they understand
and will apply, within their competences, certain provisions of an act by which they
are otherwise all bound’.37 It is therefore argued that this Decision is nothing less
than an international agreement,38 especially considering that the European Council
noted in its conclusions that the Decision ‘is legally binding on the 28 Member
States of the European Union, and may be amended or repealed only by common
accord of their Heads of State or Government.’39
However, the key difference between the Decision drafted in the ‘UK context’
and the one adopted with regard to the Ukraine Association Agreement is that the
former was an instrument agreed upon by all the Member States on the interpre-
tation of the EU Treaties, whereas the latter would be a unilateral interpretation of
an international agreement with a third country (i.e. the EU-Ukraine
Association-Agreement). As mentioned in Article 31(2) and (3) VCLT, a (subse-
quent) instrument can only constitute a legally binding interpretation of an inter-
national agreement when it is accepted by the other parties. Thus, as recognised in
the Opinion of the legal counsel, the Decision would only be a legally binding
instrument under international law, and bind the other parties, if it would be adopted
jointly with, or formally accepted by, those other contracting parties. This would
therefore not only require the consent of the Ukrainian government, but also of the
EU. Noteworthy, in the context of the signature of CETA, the EU and Canada
adopted a ‘Joint Interpretative Instrument’, which is a document that specifies how
certain provisions of CETA need to be interpreted.40 Because both parties agreed to
this Joint Interpretative Instrument, it is a legally binding instrument as foreseen in
Article 31 VCLT.41 Whether Ukraine would agree with all the five points raised by
the Dutch government is uncertain. Especially the membership-issue would be
difficult for Ukraine to accept, even if the Association Agreement does not include
an explicit membership perspective.
Thus, this Decision is binding in the sense that it imposes an interpretation of the
Association Agreement on the Member States. Member States are legally bound by
37 European Council, Opinion of the Legal Counsel, Draft Decision of the Heads of State or
Government, meeting within the European Council, on the association agreement between the
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the
one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, EUCO 37/16, 12 December 2016.
38 Wessel 2016.
39 European Council Conclusions on Ukraine, 15 December 2016.
40 Council of the European Union, Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its
Member States, 13541/16, 27 October 2016.
41 This is explicitly recognised in the preamble of this document.
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it as concerns the way they understand the Association Agreement and the way they
will apply it.42
It is also crucial to note that the Decision does not contradict or change any of
the provisions of the Association Agreement. As noted by Advocate-General
Saggio: ‘a unilateral interpretation of the agreement made in the context of an
internal adoption procedure cannot—outside the system of reservations—limit the
effects of the agreement itself’.43 The five points in the Decision are indeed in
conformity with the text of the agreement as they merely repeat what is or is not in
the Association Agreement. Therefore, the Decision stresses that it is ‘in full
conformity with the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement’.44
14.5.2 Alternative Options
It appears that the two Dutch Chambers of Parliament will find this Decision a
sufficient response to the outcome of the referendum. However, a swift approval
should not be taken for granted at this point since the ruling coalition of Prime
Minister Rutte has no majority in the Dutch Senate. Therefore, it is useful to
map-out some alternative options for the Dutch Government.
In the worst-case scenario that the Dutch Parliament would reject the Decision of
the Heads of State or Government as a response to the referendum and decide not to
ratify the agreement, the Dutch government cannot only refuse to ratify the
agreement for the Netherlands, it can also veto the EU’s ratification of the agree-
ment. As mentioned above, before the agreement can be concluded it must also be
ratified by the EU on the basis of a unanimous Council Decision for the conclusion
of the agreement. However, such a move would be difficult to reconcile with the
principle of sincere cooperation, laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, which includes a
mutual legal obligation for the EU and the Member States ‘to assist each other in
carrying out the tasks which flow from the Treaties’.
Another option would be that the EU, the Member States and Ukraine would
adopt a kind of an ‘adjusting protocol’, which would delete the Netherlands as one
of the contracting parties to the agreement. Such a strategy was adopted when
Switzerland was not in a position to ratify the Agreement on the European
Economic Area (EEA) in the early 1990s. This would mean that the Netherlands
would not adopt the Approval Act (thus following the outcome of the referendum),
42 The Opinion of the Legal Counsel even argues that the CJEU can use the Decision when
interpreting the agreement in its reasoning to assess the intention of the Member States as to the
scope of the commitments undertaken when becoming parties.
43 Opinion of Advocate General Saggio, Case C-149/96 (Portugal v Council), ECJ, ECR I-08395,
25 February 1999. On this point, see also the judgment of the International Court of Justice, Case
Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad), ICJ, Judgment, 3 February
1994.
44 This is also recognised in the Opinion of the Legal Counsel.
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but would still ratify the agreement at EU level in the Council. As a EU Member
State, the Netherlands would still be bound by the non-mixed elements of the
agreement (which covers the most important parts of the agreement). However,
such an option could create legal uncertainty because, as mentioned above, it is not
entirely clear which elements of the agreement fall under Member States’ compe-
tences. Moreover, it would be very difficult to put a clear delineation of compe-
tences on paper, especially considering the broad scope of the agreement. Such an
adjusting protocol would also require the formal approval (e.g. ratification) of the
Ukrainian authorities, the EU and the EU Member States.
There are also some non-binding solutions possible. For example the Dutch
government can adopt a unilateral statement, in which is specifies its 5 points, to be
entered in the Council minutes. Such statements, which are for example also
adopted by EU Member States in the context of CETA’s signature, are not binding
EU acts but form an integral part of the context in which the Council adopts the
decision to conclude an agreement.
A last scenario would be the combination of several of the options described
above.
14.6 Conclusion
The Decision of the Heads of State and Government is the easiest solution to solve
the ratification deadlock of this landmark agreement. While being compatible with
the Association Agreement and EU and international law, it addresses the main
concerns that were raised during the referendum and binds the Member States (but
not the Union and Ukraine). Unfortunately, a repetition of this Dutch
non-ratification saga cannot be excluded. Although the Lisbon Treaty reduced the
need for mixed agreements, it appears that mixity is here to stay. More than 30
mixed agreements have been concluded in the post-Lisbon era and if the CJEU will
follow the recent Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston on the EU-Singapore
Free Trade Agreement, who argued that this this trade agreement is mixed,45 the
future for non-mixed EU trade agreements does not look bright. Considering the
Eurosceptic climate in several Member States, it is almost bound to happen that a
Member State will (threaten to) veto the conclusion of a mixed agreement in the
future, for example in order to obtain some last-minute concessions. Whereas the
creative legal solutions to these problems will provide interesting food for thought
for scholars, they will further complicate the EU’s treaty-making procedures and
harm its role as a unified international actor.
45 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston: CJEU, Advocate General’s Opinion in Opinion pro-
cedure 2/15, Press Release No 147/16, 21 December 2016.
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